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ERISA Doctor in the House? The Duty to Disclose
Physician Incentives to Limit Health Care
Ryan Steven Johnson*
Following his return from an overseas business trip, severe
and recurring chest pains forced Patrick Shea to visit his long-
time primary care physician.' During a series of visits, Mr.
Shea discussed his family's lengthy history of heart disease
with his physician and complained of chest pains, shortness of
breath, muscle tingling, and dizziness.2 Although these symp-
toms indicated potential heart problems, Mr. Shea's physician
decided against referring Mr. Shea to a cardiologist.' Mr. Shea
persisted in expressing concern over his continuing symptoms
and even expressed his willingness to personally cover the
costs of an examination by a cardiologist.' Despite Mr. Shea's
offer, his physician persuaded him that he was too young to
justify a visit to a cardiologist.' Within mere months, Mr. Shea
died of heart failure.6
In order to receive medical benefits under the terms of his
health insurance contract through Medica,7 a health mainte-
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1996,
Gustavus Adolphus College. The author would like to thank Laurie Nesseth
and Professor Susan M. Wolf for their helpful suggestions. The author would
also like to thank Denise Willey for her support throughout law school.
1 See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 626 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 297 (1997). During this overseas trip, Mr. Shea was hospitalized
for severe chest pains. See id.
2 See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. Under the terms of his health plan, Mr. Shea was insured for
all necessary medical care, including cardiac care. See id. at 627.
5. See id. at 626. Mr. Shea was only forty years old at the time of these
examinations. See id.
6. See id.
7. Mr. Shea's employer, Seagate Technologies, Inc., provided its employ-
ees with health care benefits through a contract with Medica. See id. Under
this arrangement, Medica administered Seagate's employee health care plan.
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nance organization (HMO),' Mr. Shea could not visit a cardi-
ologist without first obtaining a referral from his primary care
physician.' Unbeknownst to either Mr. Shea or his wife, Medica
encouraged primary care physicians to minimize referrals to
cardiologists and other specialty physicians through the use of
financial incentives.'0 Following her husband's death, Mrs.
Shea learned of Medica's financial incentive scheme and
brought suit" on the belief that but for Medica's wrongful silence,
her husband would have paid for the cardiologist himself,
would have received necessary examinations and treatment,
and would not have suffered a fatal heart attack at the young
age of forty.12  In federal court, Mrs. Shea asserted that
"Medica's behind-the-scenes efforts to reduce covered referrals
violated Medica's fiduciary duties under the Employee Retire-
See id. Employer self-fimded plans are regulated by the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and are largely immune from state
regulation. See Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair
Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J.
503, 594 (1997). For a complete discussion of ERISA, see infra Part II.
8. HMOs are managed care entities that are responsible for delivering,
managing, and financing the health care services of their enrollees. See Alli-
son Faber Walsh, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment Mechanisms: The
Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 207 n.2 (1997). HMOs contract directly with health
care providers to provide cost-effective care to enrollees. See id. at 215.
HMOs exist in a variety of forms including staff-models, group-models, inde-
pendent practice associations (IPAs), and network-models. See Stephen R.
Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 401 (1996). For a fuller discussion of other managed
care entities, see infra note 15 and Part IA.
9. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 627. This cost-containment strategy is referred
to as "gatekeeping." See Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit
Services: Should Physicians be Required to Disclose these to Patients?, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1821, 1823 (1995). Physician "gatekeepers" manage patient access to
medical specialists and services by determining whether access is medically
necessary, thus guarding the gates to expensive medical services. See id. at
1824.
10. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 627. Specifically, Medica offered physicians fi-
nancial rewards if they did not exceed a designated number of referrals and
docked a percentage of their fees if they exceeded this designated amount.
See id.
11. Mrs. Shea initially brought a wrongful death action against Medica in
Minnesota state court. See id. However, on Medica's motion, the case was
removed to federal court based on ERISA's preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1994). See id. ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee plan," including self-funded health
plans. Id. at § 1144(a). For a discussion of ERISA's preemption jurispru-
dence, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
12. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 627.
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ment Income Security Act (ERISA),13 claiming that under
ERISA Medica had a duty to disclose its incentive program to
its enrollees.
14
The circumstances giving rise to Mr. Shea's tragedy are
frighteningly common. Currently, over 120 million Americans
are enrolled in managed care organizations (MCOs), 5 the ma-
jority of which increasingly rely on the use of financial incen-
tives to influence physician medical decisionmaking.16 Despite
the ubiquity of financial incentive arrangements between
MCOs and physicians 7 and the number of Americans enrolled
in MCOs, 8 many MCO enrollees are unaware of the financial
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
14. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 627.
15. See Carol J. Simon et al., The Impact of Managed Care on the Physi-
cian Marketplace, in U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUBLIc HEALTH
REPORTS 222 (1997). The American Medical Association (AMA) defines man-
aged care as "[tihe control of access to and limitation on physician and patient
utilization of services by public or private payers or their agents through the
use of prior and concurrent review for approval of or referral to service or site
of service and financial incentives or penalties." John K Iglehart, Health Pol-
icy Report: The American Health Care System, 326 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 962,
965 (1992). MCOs act as both insurers and health care providers, selling hy-
brid packages of insurance and delivery to employers and non-employer pur-
chasers. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient In-
jury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 443 (1997). MCOs exercise
both direct and indirect control over medical treatment options, an area tra-
ditionally left to the clinical judgment of physicians. See Jack K Kilcullen,
Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and Enterprise Liability, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 25-28 (1996). MCOs encompass a number of entities in-
cluding health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and preferred provider
organizations (PPOs). See Furrow, supra, at 431. PPOs are panels of physi-
cians that contract with insurers to provide medical services for insureds at
reduced rates. See Kilcullen, supra, at 26.
16. See U.S. GAO, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: MORE COMPETITION AND
OVERSIGHT WOULD IMPROVE CALIFORNIA'S EXPANSION PLAN 33 (1995) (noting
that "it has become increasingly common for HMOs to capitate physicians, or
(more typically) physician groups, for all medical services-including inpa-
tient hospital care"). The use of financial incentives is increasingly affecting
physician practice. See How Common Is Capitation?, HEALTH DATA MGMT.,
August 1997, available in LEXIS, Health Library, Rxinega File. Moreover,
"[almong practices with [HMO] contracts, nearly 20 percent of all revenues
are capitated" Carol J. Simon & David W. Emmons, Physician Earnings At
Risk: An Examination Of Capitated Contracts, HEALTH AFF., May/June 1997,
at 120, 120.
17. See Simon & Emmons, supra note 16, at 120.
18. See Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s,
HEALTH AFF., May/June 1997, at 134, 134 (observing that American enroll-
ment in HMOs rose from 36.5 million in 1990 to 58.2 million by 1995); Gail A.
Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the
1990s, HEALTH AFF., JaniFeb. 1997, at 125, 126 (noting that approximately
16331998]
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incentives MCOs employ to affect physicians' decisions to pro-
vide referrals to specialists, order diagnostic tests, or recom-
mend certain treatments. 9 Unfortunately, as Patrick Shea's
experience illustrates, such ignorance can produce devastating
results.
In February 1997, the Eighth Circuit delivered a landmark
decision, holding that ERISA imposes an affirmative duty2" on
plan fiduciaries to disclose the existence and nature of financial
incentives imposed on physicians to affect their medical deci-
sionmaking.21 According to the court, "[h]ealth care decisions
involve matters of life and death, and an ERISA fiduciary has
a duty to speak out if it 'knows that silence might be harm-
ful.'" ' Although arriving at the correct result, the Shea court's
five-page opinion fails to provide courts or commentators with
significant guidance.'
This Note argues that ERISA requires MCOs and physi-
cians to disclose the existence and nature of financial incen-
tives designed to influence physician decisionmaking Part I
75% of American workers receive their health insurance through an MCO);
Simon et al., supra note 15, at 222 (noting that American enrollment in man-
aged care organizations rose from 10 million in 1982 to over 120 million in
1995).
19. See HMO Homepage (visited Feb. 17, 1998) <httpV/www.bmopage.org
/mechanics.htm]>; cf. Stephen L. Isaacs, Consumers' Information Needs: Re-
sults of a National Survey, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 31, 33-34 (finding
that most Americans do not understand how managed care operates).
20. I use the concept of an affirmative disclosure duty to denote a free-
standing obligation to disclose, a duty that is not dependent on the conduct of
either ERISA fiduciaries or beneficiaries.
21. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 297 (1997). Only two federal courts have directly addressed the is-
sue of whether ERISA requires MCOs to disclose financial incentives designed
to influence physician decisionmaking. Compare Shea, 107 F.3d at 629
(holding that an HMO was required to disclose its physician incentive scheme
to enrollees), with Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 755
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that ERISA does not require HMOs to disclose their
physician incentive arrangements to plan enrollees).
22. Shea, 107 F.3d at 629 (quoting Bixler v. Central Penn. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Plan, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993)).
23. See id. at 625-29.
24. Several scholars have addressed the issue of whether ERISA imposes
an affirmative duty to disclose on plan fiduciaries. See, e.g., Edward E. Bintz,
Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA: Is There Ever a Fiduciary Duty to
Disclose?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 979, 1015-17 (1993) (arguing for a fiduciary duty
to disclose in instances that would clearly advance ERISA's principal goal of
protecting the interests of plan beneficiaries); Bryan L. Clobes, In the Wake of
Varity Corp. v. Howe: An Affirmative Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Under
ERISA, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 221, 223 (1997) (concluding that ERISA imposes
[Vol. 82:16311634
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examines the history of the managed care industry and the
cost-control mechanisms it employs. Part H outlines ERISA's
fiduciary jurisprudence and details its express disclosure re-
quirements. Part Il argues that by exercising discretionary
control over the administration of an ERISA plan, MCOs and
physicians assume ERISA fiduciary status and are thus gov-
erned by its fiduciary obligations.' Part III further argues that
ERISA's fiduciary jurisprudence requires MCOs and physicians to
disclose physician incentive schemes to MCO enrollees.
I. THE MANAGED CARE INDUSTRY
A. THE RISE OF MANAGED CARE
Until recently, insurance companies reimbursed physi-
cians for medical care primarily on a fee-for-service basis.26
The fee-for-service system traditionally provided patients with
complete freedom to select physicians, provided physicians
with complete freedom to select the cost and method of medical
treatment for their patients, and vested insurance companies
with complete responsibility for health care expenses they were
powerless to control.27 By insulating physicians and patients
from health care costs, this system failed to provide either
group with any incentive to minimize costly and unnecessary
care,2 a system blamed for the skyrocketing health care costs
of the last several decades.29
an affirmative duty to disclose on plan fiduciaries where the fiduciary knows
that silence might be harmful to the beneficiary). Scholars have also ad-
dressed the issue of whether physicians should be required to disclose such
information to their patients under a doctrine of informed consent. See
McGraw, supra note 9, at 1847 (concluding that ethical principles and legal
precedents indicate that physicians have a duty to disclose MCO physician
reimbursement schemes to their patients).
25. For a general discussion of fiduciary liability under ERISA in the era
of managed care, see Clifford A. Cantor, Fiduciary Liability in Emerging
Health Care, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 189 (1997) (discussing the circumstances in
which plan sponsors, insurers, third-party administrators, individual corpo-
rate officers, gatekeepers, utilization reviewers, and other health entities as-
sume ERISA fiduciary status).
26. See Latham, supra note 8, at 400. Under a fee-for-service system,
physicians are retroactively reimbursed by the insurer for the services they
provide to patients. See id.
27. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 213.
28. See id. Under this system, "the more a physician did, the more the
physician got paid." Henry T. Greely, Direct Incentives in Managed Care: Un-
answered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIx 53, 56 (1996).
29. See McGraw, supra note 9, at 1822. Despite the dominance of the
1998] 1635
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Politicians, private insurance companies, and employers
latched onto the concept of managed care as a way to regulate
medical expenditures and curtail rising costs.3" As opposed to
the traditional fee-for-service system, managed care employs
an assortment of cost-containment mechanisms that encourage
physicians to incorporate economic considerations into their
medical decisionmaking.3' To achieve this objective, MCOs tie
physicians' compensation to specified rates of diagnostic tests,
referral counts to specialists, and use of other costly medical
treatments.32 Physicians are encouraged to minimize their use
of these medical services through the use of bonuses, 3 capitation
payment schemes,34 and withhold arrangements.35 For example,
managed care industry, medical costs are predicted to continue to rise during
next several years. See Catherine Potts, 3%... 5%... 10% ... Hike! Poten-
tial Increases for Managed Care, 71 HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS 62 (1997)
(estimating that health care costs could grow at nearly double the rate of in-
flation over the course of the next five years).
30. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 210.
31. See id. at 215.
32. See Marsha Gold et al., Behind the Curve: A Critical Assessment of
How Little Is Known About Arrangements Between Managed Care Plans and
Physicians, 52 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 307, 324-35 (1995) (reviewing the vari-
ous payment approaches used by MCOs).
33. Bonuses reward physicians for cost-effectiveness, a criterion not
solely premised on staying within an MCO's parameters of medical service.
See Latham, supra note 8, at 403 (discussing the nature and variety of physi-
cian bonus formulae under managed care).
34. Federal regulations define 'capitation" as "a set dollar payment per
patient per unit of time (usually per month) that an organization pays a phy-
sician or physician group to cover a specified set of services and administra-
tive costs without regard to the actual number of services provided." 42 CFR
§ 417.479(c) (1997). A recent article described the nature of capitation
schemes:
Capitation breaks the link between higher utilization and higher
physician reimbursements .... Physicians assume responsibility for
the costs of the treatments they provide and may also be responsible
for the costs of referrals, laboratory tests, and hospital services. In
this manner, insurers shift the cost of treatment and much of the
traditional insurance risk directly to physician practices and directly
or indirectly to physicians themselves.
Simon & Emmons, supra note 16, at 120. At least one study suggests that
capitation has been proven to be an effective method of controlling costs of
medical care. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives
Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health
Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86, 86 (1989).
35. In a withhold arrangement, a percentage of each physician's capitated
payment or negotiated fee is withheld and deposited in a risk pool. See
Latham, supra note 8, at 404. Risk pool funds are used to pay for referral
services and other services exceeding budget expectations. See id. At the end
of an accounting period, the funds remaining in the risk pool are distributed
1636 [Vol. 82:1631
ERISA DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE?
under capitation arrangements, if an MCO's suggested pa-
rameters of care are exceeded, the excess costs are borne by
physicians.36 Conversely, under capitation, physicians keep
any savings generated from providing cost efficient health
care.
37
B. THE PRACTICE OF MANAGED CARE
Managed care has resulted in at least a one-time lowering
of health care costs38 and significantly affected the practice of
medicine.39 According to one study, HMO plans have used an
average of twenty-two percent fewer tests, procedures, and
other expensive treatments than fee-for-service insurance
companies.4 A different study found that by linking physician
compensation to referral count as a means of reducing unnec-
essary referrals, MCO reimbursement schemes deter both un-
necessary and necessary referrals to specialty physicians.4' Al-
though the effects of MCO physician incentive schemes on
patient mortality and morbidity are currently uncertain,42 em-
pirical data indicate that patients in MCOs that use such sys-
tems are often treated differently than their fee-for-service
counterparts.43
among participating physicians. See id. If the funds have been depleted due
to an excessive number of referrals or other services, the physicians share the
loss. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 219. Some plans impose further risk on
physicians by holding them responsible for any costs above those covered by
the withhold fund. See Latham, supra note 8, at 404.
36. See Simon & Emmons, supra note 16, at 120.
37. See Greely, supra note 28, at 90.
38. See Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Man-
aged Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251,
252 (1997). It is not clear that these savings will endure. See id.
39. See Furrow, supra note 15, at 435-36 (discussing empirical studies
that have found a link between managed care and underutilized medical
services). For a recent review of the empirical literature comparing performance
of managed care and fee-for-service systems, see Robert H. Miller & Harold S.
Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?, HEALTH
AFF., SeptiOct. 1997, at 7, 7.
40. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Perform-
ance Since 1980:A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1515 (1994).
4L See Furrow, supra note 15, at 436.
42. See 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024 (1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 417,
434 (1998)) (proposed Dec. 14, 1992) (noting that neither the Department of
Health and Human Services nor any member of the research community has
identified "a link between the quality of care provided under the Medicare and
Medicaid programs and the structure of physician incentive plans").
43. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing empirical
data).
16371998]
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C. THE DOMINANCE OF MANAGED CARE
The last two decades have witnessed an explosive growth in
the managed care industry." Between 1970 and 1990, enrollment
in HMOs grew by more than tenfold, from 3.6 million to more
than thirty-five million enrollees. 5 As of 1996, an estimated
sixty million Americans were enrolled in IMOs." Moreover,
from 1995 to 1997, the percentage of American workers who
receive their health care through an MCO increased from fifty-
one percent to seventy-three percent. 7 As of 1997, approxi-
mately sixty percent of physicians were involved in contractual
relations with HMOs and commonly derived a significant per-
centage of their financial compensation from these relation-
ships.48 Over ninety percent of physician groups are expected
to be treating patients under a capitated agreement within the
next year.49
Although the rise of managed care has significantly af-
fected the delivery of health care in America, the majority of
Americans remain unaware of the existence of financial incen-
tives designed to alter their physicians' decisionmaking proc-
esses." Similarly, many persons are unaware of the gatekeeping
systems employed by MCOs to restrict access to specialist
physicians.5 One reason for this ignorance is that MCOs gen-
erally do not have any legal obligation to disclose such infor-
mation. 2
44 See supra note 18 (discussing growth in MCO enrollment).
45. See McGraw, supra note 9, at 1823.
46. See Robert Pear, Laws Won't Let H.M.O.'s Tell Doctors What to Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1996, at A12.
47. See Jensen, supra note 18, at 126.
48. See How Common Is Capitation?, HEALTH DATA MGMT., August 1997,
available in LEXIS, Health Library, Rxmega File. Moreover, "[almong prac-
tices with [HMO] contracts, nearly 20 percent of all revenues are capitated."
Simon & Emmons, supra note 16, at 120.
49. See How Common Is Capitation?, supra note 48.
50. See McGraw, supra note 9, at 1824 (discussing empirical studies com-
paring the managed care and fee-for-service systems); David Mechanic et al.,
Choosing Among Health Insurance Options: A Study of New Employees, 27
INQUIRY 18 (1990); Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Ap-
proach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1017
(1997).
51. See Isaacs, supra note 19, at 33-34 (listing percentages of people who
are uninformed about the various aspects of MCOs). See supra note 9(explaining the gatekeeping system).
52. See Rai, supra note 50, at 1017.
1638 [Vol. 82:1631
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D. EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Aware of the potential for abuse in a system designed to
affect physicians' medical decisionmaking 3 federal officials
have designed and implemented a number of regulations to
protect Medicare and Medicaid HMO enrollees from potential
harm. 4 These regulations prohibit HMOs from offering physi-
cians financial incentives to limit medically necessary services"5
and require HMOs to disclose information concerning physi-
cian incentive plans to any Medicare beneficiary who requests
such information. 6 Unfortunately, these regulations protect
only Medicare and Medicaid recipients.
The dangers posed by contracts between MCOs and phy-
sicians have also prompted states to enact laws designed to
regulate the conduct of MCOs.5 7 For example, states have en-
acted laws requiring health plans to disclose information con-
cerning financial incentive arrangements to plan participants. 8
In the majority of states, however, MCOs have no legal obliga-
tion to disclose such information to MCO enrollees. 9 Moreover,
even in those states that require disclosure, employer self-
funded health plansO are insulated from state laws regulating
53. According to the AMA, one of the primary dangers posed by managed
care is that "physicians have an incentive to cut corners in their patient care,
by temporizing too long, eschewing extra diagnostic tests, or refraining from
an expensive referral." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Ethical
Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 333 (1995). The obvious concern is
that patients may not receive the medical care they need in a system in which
physicians may sacrifice their patients' best interests for private economic
gain.
54. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1997).
55. See id. § 417.479(d).
56. See id. § 417.479(h)(3)(i).
57. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20 A-6 (Supp. 1997) (prohibiting man-
aged care plans from using "a financial incentive program that directly com-
pensates a health care provider for ordering or providing less than medically
necessary and appropriate care to his or her patients").
58. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4302 (West Supp. 1997)
(requiring health plans to provide a "general description of the methods used
to compensate providers, including capitation and methods in which providers
receive compensation based on referrals, utilization, or cost criteria").
59. Only a handful of states currently require the disclosure of physician
incentive arrangements to MCO enrollees. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-
2323 (1997); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.10 (West 1997); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:2232 (West Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4302
(West Supp. 1997); Mb. CODE ANN., INSURANCE § 15-121 (1997).
60. Self-funded health care plans are "established or maintained by an
employer.., for the purpose of providing for its participants or their benefici-
16391998]
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insurance by ERISA's preemption provision.61 A state is
thereby prevented from regulating self-funded health care
plans or enunciating comprehensive health care policies to
safeguard all of its citizens. Moreover, ERISA frequently bars
persons enrolled in self-funded health plans from bringing
state tort law or statutory claims against MCOs.62 Notably,
most Americans obtain their health insurance through em-
ployer self-funded health care plans.63 The combination of
ERISA's preemption provision and the absence of a federal
analogue to many state law claims leaves many plaintiffs with-
aries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical,
or hospital care or benefits .... 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1994).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a)-(b) (1994). ERISA preempts "any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan." Id. § 1144(a). Although Congress expressly exempted state laws gov-
erning insurance from the scope of ERISA's preemption clause, laws that pur-
port to regulate insurance as applied to a self-funded health care plan remain
subject to ERISA preemption. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (providing that no self-
insured pension or benefits plan "shall be deemed to be an insurance company
or other insurer" by any state insurance law). This provision is known as the
"deemer clause." See Edward Alburo Morrissey, Legislative Reform, Deem
and Deemer: ERISA Preemption Under the Deemer Clause as Applied to Em-
ployer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J. LEGIs. 307, 309
(1997).
With regard to claims against MCOs, courts have begun to distinguish be-
tween claims based on plan administration, which are preempted by ERISA,
and plan quality, which are not. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d
350, 358 (3d Cir. 1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995). At least
one case suggests that state actions premised on fraudulent disclosure or
nondisclosure concern plan administration. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d
625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997) (finding that
widow's wrongful death claim premised on fraudulent nondisclosure was pre-
empted by ERISA). According to the court, allowing state law to impose dis-
closure obligations on plan administrators would frustrate national uniformity
by forcing administrators to tailor their disclosure obligations "to meet each
state's unique requirements." Id. For a more complete discussion of ERISA's
broad preemption, see Walter E. Schuler, Note, The ERISA Pre-emption Nar-
rows: Analysis of New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and Its Impact on State Regulation of
Health Care, 40 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 783, 784 (1996) (noting that ERISA has
been called "the most sweeping federal preemption statute ever enacted by
Congress").
62. See, e.g., Shea, 107 F.3d at 627; Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972
F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding plaintiffs claim for breach of an
implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing to be preempted by the terms
of ERISA).
63. Karen Ann Jensen, Comment, Genetic Privacy in Washington State:
Policy Considerations and a Model Genetic Privacy Act, 21 SEATrLE U. L.
REV. 357, 372 (1997).
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out an adequate legal remedy." Their only recourse is to sue
under ERISA.
11. ERISA AND THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
ERISA governs the operation of self-funded employee
benefits plans in a manner designed to protect employees, re-
tirees, and their beneficiaries. 5 In accordance with the goal of
shielding plan participants and beneficiaries from potential
harm," ERISA's broad regulatory scheme expressly requires
the disclosure of certain information67 to plan enrollees and
imposes fiduciary standards68 on persons involved in both plan
management and administration.69
A. EXPRESS DIsCLosuRE REQUIREM ENTS
As a means of empowering plan beneficiaries to enforce
their rights under an ERISA benefits plan," Congress imposed
several specific disclosure requirements on ERISA plan admin-
64. Following removal to federal court, plaintiffs frequently find their
state claims dismissed. See Brooks Richardson, Comment, Health Care:
ERISA Preemption and HMO Liability-A Fresh Look at ERISA Preemption
in the Context of Subscriber Claims Against HMOs, 49 OKA. L. REV. 677, 692
(1996). Moreover, even if such claims are recharacterized as ERISA claims,
plaintiffs are limited to the equitable remedies provided by ERISA section
502: lost benefits, injunctions, restitution, and other equitable remedies. See
Farrell, supra note 38, at 285. ERISA does not authorize recovery for com-
pensatory relief or punitive damages. See id.
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994). According to its text, ERISA was de-
signed:
(to] protect... participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to partici-
pants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with re-
spect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by pro-
viding for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts.
Id.
66. See id.
67. See id. § 1024(b)(1).
68. ERISA fiduciaries must "discharge [their] duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." Id § 1104(a)(1)
(emphasis added). The duty to act solely in the interests of plan participants
and beneficiaries is based on the common law duty of loyalty imposed on trus-
tees. See Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1162 (6th Cir. 1988);
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
69. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994).
70. See id. § 1001(b).
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istrators.7? Under ERISA's terms, plan administrators are re-
quired to provide a summary plan description (SPD) to each
participant in the plan. The SPD's technical disclosure re-
quirements include the plan's name, the type of employee
benefit plan, a description of circumstances that may result in
ineligibility, and the plan's eligibility rules for participation
and benefits.72 ERISA emphasizes the importance of present-
ing the information in a manner that maximizes the likelihood
of beneficiary comprehension.73
B. FIDUCIARIES AND THEIR DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
Under ERISA's terms, a person is a fiduciary "to the ex-
tent" that she "exercises any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary control respecting management," or "has any discre-
tionary... responsibility in the administration" of the plan.74
ERISA defines fiduciary status in functional terms75 and limits
the scope of a person's fiduciary duty to conduct and decisions
relevant to the management or administration of the plan.76
Lower courts have indicated that Congress intended ERISA's
definition of fiduciary to be broadly construed. 77 Through their
discretionary administration of health care plans, MCOs as-
sume fiduciary status under ERISA.8
In Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.,9 the Fifth Circuit
held that utilization review by a utilization review organization
71. See id. § 1021. ERISA defines a "plan administrator" as the person
named in the written instrument. See id. § 1002(16)(A)(i). If the written in-
strument does not name such a person, the plan sponsor becomes the default
"Plan administrator." See id § 1002(16)(A)(ii). In the absence of a named adminis-
trator, and if a plan sponsor cannot be identified, ERISA authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to designate an administrator by regulation. See id. § 1002(16)(A)(iii).
72. See id. § 1022.
73. See id. § 1022(a)(i) (requiring that the language in the plans be
"calculated to be understood by the average plan participant").
74. See id. 8H 1002(21)(A)(i), (iii) (emphasis added).
75. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (noting that
ERISA "defines 'fiduciary' not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional
terms of control and authority over the plan.., thus expanding the universe
of persons subject to fiduciary duties").
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (1994).
77. See Cantor, supra note 25, at 191.
78. See O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1386 (11th Cir. 1990); Mo-
rales v. Health Plus, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 464, 468 (D.P.R. 1997); Weiss v. Cigna
Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
79. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). In Corcoran, Mrs. Corcoran, a long-
time employee of the South Central Bell Telephone Company (Bell), filed a
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(URO)O constituted administration of an ERISA benefits plan."
The court reasoned that although URO decisions are often medi-
cal in nature, these decisions take place "in the context of mak-
ing a determination about the availability of benefits under the
plan.""2 By determining whether plan enrollees were eligible for
treatment covered by the plan, the URO ultimately determined
whether they were entitled to employee benefits and thus exer-
cised discretionary control in plan administration. 3
C. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
AND THE COMMON LAW OF TRUSTS
Congress invoked the common law of trusts to help define
the appropriate duties of ERISA fiduciaries. 4 Rather than
medical malpractice claim against Blue Cross & Blue Shield, an MCO that
administered Bell's self-funded health benefits plan, and United Healthcare, a
utilization review firm that monitored the self-funded plan. See id. at 1322-
24. In 1989, Mrs. Corcoran became pregnant. See id. at 1322. Towards the
end of her pregnancy, Mrs. Corcoran's obstetrician ordered her hospitalized
for the purpose of constant monitoring of the fetus. See id. at 1322-23.
United determined that hospitalization was not necessary and recommended
ten hours per day of home nursing care. See id. at 1324. Despite United's de-
termination, Mrs. Corcoran entered the hospital, but because of United's fail-
ure to approve the hospitalization, she was discharged within ten days. See
id. Less than two weeks later, the fetus went into distress and died. See id.
80. UROs use boards of hired physicians and nurses to review each in-
sured patient's records to determine if prescribed treatments are medically
necessary. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 216. If the board concludes that
treatment is not medically necessary, that treatment is not covered by the
health plan. See id. Under Bell's plan, United was required to pre-approve
certain medical decisions. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1323. If a plan partici-
pant ignored United's determination that a certain treatment was unneces-
sary and received such treatment, the plan participant would be penalized by
having her benefits reduced by twenty percent for the remainder of the calen-
dar year. See id.
8L See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331.
82. Id. According to the court:
By its very nature, a system of prospective decisionmaking influ-
ences the beneficiary's choice among treatment options to a far
greater degree than does the theoretical risk of disallowance of a
claim facing a beneficiary in a retrospective system. Indeed, the per-
ception among insurers that prospective determinations result in
lower health care costs is premised on the likelihood that a benefici-
ary, faced with the knowledge of specifically what the plan will and
will not pay for, will choose the treatment option recommended by
the plan in order to avoid risking total or partial disallowance of
benefits.
Id. at 1332.
83. See id. at 1331.
84. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct 1065, 1070 (1996); S. REP. No.
127, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4639, 4865 (declaring that
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providing an exhaustive and explicit enumeration of all fiduci-
ary powers and duties, Congress expected courts to supplement
ERISA's express provisions by developing a "federal common
law of rights and obligations." 5 Precedent makes clear that so
long as courts do not revise ERISA's text,86 courts are author-
ized to develop a federal common law to supplement ERISA
when necessary to effectuate its purposes.87
The "duty to disclose material information is the core of a
fiduciary's responsibility" under the common law of trusts.88
Trustees must neither mislead nor deceive plan beneficiaries.89
Moreover, a beneficiary's request triggers the duty for fiduciar-
ies to disclose "complete and accurate information material to
the beneficiary's circumstance,"" including information that
"comprises elements about which the beneficiary has not spe-
cifically inquired."9' Failure to faithfully discharge these broad
ERISA's "fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes ap-
plicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of
the common law of trusts").
85. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1070 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989)).
86. See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 252-60 (1993). Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court:
IT]he law of trusts will often inform, but will not necessarily deter-
mine the outcome of an effort to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties.
In some instances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after
which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the lan-
guage of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing
from the common-law trust requirements.
Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1070.
87. See Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir.
1992).
88. Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
89. See Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074; Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275,
278-79 (2d Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405
(8th Cir. 1995); Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that once a beneficiary has
requested information from an ERISA fiduciary who is aware of the benefici-
ary's status and circumstances, the fiduciary has an obligation to convey
complete and accurate information material to the beneficiary's circum-
stances); Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992);
Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Peoria
Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983).
90. Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300.
91. Id. Importantly, "while the beneficiary may, at times, bear a burden
of informing the fiduciary of her material circumstances, the fiduciary's obli-
gations will not be excused merely because she failed to comprehend or ask
about a technical aspect of the plan." Id.
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disclosure obligations constitutes a breach of the fiduciary's
duty towards the beneficiary.92
Although the common law of trusts imposes broad disclo-
sure requirements on trustees, an affirmative duty does not
typically exist for trustees to disclose material facts to their
beneficiaries absent a direct inquiry.' The common law does
recognize, however, an affirmative duty when the trustee pos-
sesses superior knowledge of certain information that the
beneficiary needs to know to protect her interests.94 According
to the Second Restatement of Trusts, "[the trustee] is under a
duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting
the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary
does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his
protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his in-
terest.' 5
D. JUDIcIAL PERSPECTIVES CONCERNING AN AFFIRMATIVE
DUTY TO DISCLOSE PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES UNDER ERISA
The first two courts to consider whether ERISA requires
MCOs to disclose the existence of their physician incentive
schemes to their enrollees have reached contrary conclusions.96
In Shea v. Esensten, the Eighth Circuit held that an MCO's fi-
nancial incentive scheme for reducing referrals was a material
fact, and thus the MCO had a duty under ERISA to affirma-
tively disclose such information to its enrollees. 97 The court
concluded that in the absence of such information, a patient
cannot reasonably be expected to protect her own interests.9 8
92. See id.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
94. See id.; see also Eddy, 919 F.2d at 747 (holding that once an employee
informed his group health insurer that his employer was terminating his in-
surance policy, insurer had a duty under ERISA to provide complete and ac-
curate material information about his status and conversion option).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c (1959).
96. Compare Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Medica, an MCO, was a fiduciary under ERISA and was therefore required to
disclose its financial incentive scheme to its members), with Weiss v. Cigna
Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the fiduciary
duties imposed by ERISA go no further than forbidding fiduciaries from in-
tentionally misleading or deceiving beneficiaries).
97. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 628-29.
98. See id.
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A mere five months later, in Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare,
Inc.,99 New York's Southern District Court refused to join the
Eighth Circuit, holding instead that ERISA's disclosure re-
quirements did not go beyond the "obligation to neither deceive
nor mislead plan participants or beneficiaries about material
facts; i.e., not to lie to them."'00 Thus, according to the Weiss
court, in the absence of misleading or deceptive conduct by the
fiduciary, failure to speak does not constitute a breach of
ERISA's fiduciary obligations. ' Future decisions must resolve
this jurisprudential divide.
I. ERISA REQUIRES MCOS AND PHYSICIANS TO
DISCLOSE PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE
SCHEMES TO PATIENTS
Future courts should join the Eighth Circuit and recognize
that ERISA imposes on MCOs an affirmative duty to disclose
the existence and nature of its physician incentive arrange-
ments to plan enrollees. Furthermore, future courts should go
beyond the Shea decision, should recognize physicians as
ERISA fiduciaries, and should hold that ERISA obliges physi-
cians to disclose the existence of financial incentive arrange-
ments that present potential conflicts of interest.
99. 972 F. Supp. at 748. The plaintiff in Weiss alleged that the defendant
breached its general fiduciary obligation under ERISA by failing to affirma-
tively disclose the existence and nature of its compensation of physicians. See
id. at 753.
100. Id. at 754. Although the Weiss court recognized that Supreme Court
precedent authorized courts to go beyond the "bounds of express statutory re-
quirements," it refused to interpret ERISA's general fiduciary language to
supplement disclosure obligations expressly detailed in another part of the
statute. Id. The court noted that the general fiduciary obligations set forth in
ERISA's section 404 do not refer to the disclosure of information to plan par-
ticipants, and thus, the court concluded "it would be 'inappropriate to infer an
unlimited disclosure obligation on the basis of general provisions that say
nothing' about such duties." Id. (quoting Board of Trustees of the CWA/ITU,
107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1997)). In determining the scope of ERISA's fiduci-
ary duties, other courts have pursued a similar interpretative strategy. See,
e.g., Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that because the specific disclosure obligations in ERISA sections 101 to 111
do not mention physician incentives, it would be inappropriate for courts to
interpret section 404's general fiduciary obligations to require the disclosure
of such information).
101. See Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 754.
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A. MCOs AND PHYSICIANS ARE ERISA FIDuCuES TO THE
EXTENT THEY EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OR
CONTROL OVER THE MANAGEMENT OR ADMINISTRATION OF
AN ERISA PLAN
ERISA unconditionally imposes fiduciary status on any
person who "exercises any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary control" over the management or administration of an
employee self-funded health benefits plan. 2 Literally read, if
either MCOs or physicians exercise any control in plan admini-
stration or management, they qualify as ERISA fiduciaries.'013
In determining whether an MCO's or physician's conduct
amounts to plan administration or management, Supreme
Court precedent indicates that a functional analysis should
guide the inquiry.
0 4
1. MCOs Are ERISA Fiduciaries
Applying the Supreme Court's functional test"5 within the
context of the managed care industry demonstrates that MCOs
become ERISA fiduciaries when they employ physician incen-
tive schemes to administer self-funded health plans. Managed
care plans work with a limited budget.06 To keep costs down,
MCOs must allocate resources in a way that avoids expending
scarce resources in a wasteful manner.07 MCOs enlist physi-
cian support in their cost-containment project through the use
of financial incentives.08 By influencing physician decision-
making, MCO guidelines affect whether plan members receive
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
103. See O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1990); Mo-
rales v. Health Plus, Inc., 954 F. Supp 464, 468-69 (D.P.R. 1997); Weiss, 972 F.
Supp. at 751.
104. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of
fiduciary status).
105. See note 75 and accompanying text.
106. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, supra note 53, at
273 JAMA 330 (1995). Aside from the obvious lack of infinite funds, the need
to guarantee the financial viability of the MCO and to curb healthcare expen-
ditures so that insurance is affordable to employers set budgetary limits on
MCOs.
107. See id. For-profit MCOs also seek to avoid unnecessary spending so
that they can compete and report favorable information to their shareholders.
See id.
108. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing financial
incentives).
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medical services covered by their health plans.'09 Empirical
studies confirm that the use of financial incentives reduces
some medical services, ' and thus ultimately affects allocation
of plan benefits to enrollees. Although financial incentives
admittedly exert only indirect control on physician behavior,
ERISA's language does not differentiate direct from indirect
control, nor does it require ultimate and final control over such
activities."' Through their use of such incentive systems,
MCOs exercise discretionary control over the administration of
ERISA plans.
2. Physicians Are ERISA Fiduciaries
While the law has generally refused to recognize physi-
cians as fiduciaries with respect to ERISA health plans,"'
functional analysis indicates that under the appropriate cir-
cumstances physicians should be recognized as ERISA fiduci-
aries. Physician decisionmaking, although inherently medical
in nature, constitutes benefits determination within the con-
109. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing one study that
found that the use of financial incentives reduced both necessary and unnec-
essary referrals).
110. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (examining MCO reim-
bursement schemes).
ll. See supra text accompanying note 74 (providing ERISA's definition of
a "fiduciary").
112. See Cantor, supra note 25, at 208. Traditionally, state law medical
malpractice claims against physicians have not been preempted by ERISA.
See id. Consequently, persons injured as a result of a physician's failure to
disclose remain free to bring malpractice suits against physicians, and, in
some states, against MCOs under the theory of respondeat superior. See Rice
v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a medical malpractice
claim against an MCO was not completely preempted by ERISA); Lupo v.
Human Affairs Intl, Inc., 28 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling that medical mal-
practice, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims were not preempted by ERISA); see also supra note 61
(discussing recent distinction between claims based on plan administration,
which are preempted, and claims based on plan quality, which are not pre-
empted).
Although the threat of malpractice lawsuits may curb abuses by both
physicians and MCOs, the tort law system is an inadequate mechanism for
protecting plan enrollees from harm in the era of managed care. Tort law
only provides retrospective compensatory relief, a poor substitute for com-
pletely avoiding the injury with continued health and longevity. Mandated
disclosure empowers plan enrollees by informing them of potential conflicts of
interest and thus allows them to better protect their health from the dangers
associated with the use of physician incentives. See McGraw, supra note 9, at
1843 (discussing the inadequacies of the tort law system with regard to phy-
sician incentives in managed care).
1648 [Vol. 82:1631
ERISA DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE?
text of managed care."' The financial incentive arrangements
employed by MCOs effectively delegate discretionary control to
physicians to determine which plan members are entitled to
medical benefits covered by their health plans. For example,
under the gatekeeper system, if a physician does not provide a
plan member with a referral to a specialist, the health plan
will not cover the cost of that service.1
4
In addition to making these individualized determinations,
physicians also control the allocation of health care benefits
among plan members. Financial incentives increase physician
awareness of resource scarcity, forcing the physician to con-
sider resource allocation with respect to patient need."5 As
noted by the AMA:
[Tihe physician is required by rules and encouraged by incentives to
be aware of the overall financial limitations of the managed care en-
tity for which he or she works. The physician knows that there are
other patients who have subscribed to the managed care plan and
who are owed a certain level of health care. These competing con-
cerns mean that a patienfs further treatment depends not only on
the physician's judgment about the legitimacy of that patient's pres-
ent medical need but also on the relative weight of that need in com-
parison with the organization's need to serve all patients and control
costs.,
6
Ultimately, by deciding which plan members receive refer-
rals to specialists or receive other costly procedures covered in
the health plan, physicians allocate benefits among plan mem-
bers. Benefits determination constitutes plan administration
and thus a fiduciary function under ERISA." 7 Consequently, to
the extent that physicians exercise such discretionary control,
physicians fit within ERISA's functional definition of fiduciary.
B. A DUTY TO DISCLOSE PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION
ARRANGEMENTS
Functional analysis compels the conclusion that the fi-
nancial incentive arrangements between MCOs and physicians
impose ERISA fiduciary status on both groups."' The next in-
113. Cf. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that utilization review constituted benefits determination despite its
inherent medical nature).
114. See McGraw, supra note 9, at 1823 (discussing the role of the
"gatekeeper" physician).
115. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, supra note 53, at
330.
116. Id. at 332.
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quiry is whether physicians and MCOs must affirmatively dis-
close physician incentive information to plan enrollees. Al-
though ERISA's text does not explicitly answer this question,
the common law of trusts, congressional intent, ERISA's pur-
pose, and public policy all support imposing such an obligation
on both MCOs and physicians.
1. ERISA's Incorporation of the Common Law of Trusts
Requires Disclosure
The common law of trusts requires a trustee to disclose
material facts affecting a beneficiary's interests when the trus-
tee knows that the beneficiary is ignorant of such facts and
that such knowledge is necessary to allow the beneficiary to
protect her interests.' 9 MCOs presumably know that many of
their enrollees are unaware that their physicians benefit fi-
nancially by minimizing patient access to specialty physicians,
diagnostic testing procedures, and other costly services. The
vast majority of MCO enrollees are unaware of the potentially
hazardous fact that their physicians receive financial incen-
tives to reduce their consumption of medical resources. '2° His-
torically, MCOs have maintained this ignorance through non-
disclosure and the use of "gag clauses"'2 ' that prohibit physicians
from discussing their financial incentive arrangements with
patients.'" Absent the belief that enrollees are unaware of
their MCOs' physician incentive schemes, the purpose of these
gag clauses becomes difficult to discern.
117. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1077 (1995) (noting that "a
plan administrator engages in a fiduciary act when making a discretionary
determination about whether a claimant is entitled to benefits under the
terms of the plan documents"); Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Mut., 982 F.2d 1031, 1035 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that "[wihen an
insurance company administers claims for [a plan] and has authority to grant
or deny the claims, the company is an ERISA 'fiduciary"); Corcoran, 965 F.2d
at 1331 (holding that a URO that determined medical necessity ultimately
made benefits determinations, and thus was an ERISA fiduciary); Cantor, su-
pra note 25, at 206.
118. See supra Part Ill.A.
119. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
121. Gag clauses are contractual provisions between MCOs and physicians
that often proscribe physicians from communicating specified information to
patients. See Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Stop Gagging Physicians, 7 HEALTH
MATRIX 187, 194 (1997).
122. See id. These provisions often prohibit physicians from discussing
their compensation agreements with a patient under the threat of having
their contract terminated by the MCO. See id.
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Patients generally trust and rely on their physicians' advice
about medical treatment options.n In the absence of information
concerning physician incentives to minimie medical services,
some enrollees will undoubtedly follow treatment recommenda-
tions blindly, deprived of the opportunity to actively protect
their health interests in an informed manner. If provided with
such information, enrollees could choose to protect their health
interests by rejecting their physicians' decisions and personally
covering the expense of unauthorized treatment'24 or by using
their MCOs' grievance mechanisms more aggressively. Enrol-
lees could also sue for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA if
they believed that their physicians were improperly motivated
by self-serving financial considerations.'2 The common law of
trusts intended affirmative disclosure of information in pre-
cisely these types of circumstances: The plan fiduciary knows
that the beneficiary is not in possession of information needed
to protect her interests involving matters of life and death.'26
2. Affirmative Disclosure Obligations Accord with ERISA's
Text
Although ERISA's incorporation of the common law of
trusts suggests that ERISA fiduciaries have an affirmative
123. See John G. Bradley et al., Patient Preferences for Control in Medical
Decision Making: A Scenario Based Approach, 28 FAM. MED. 496, 496 (1996)
("Although preference for level of control in medical decisionmaking varied by
scenario... patients most often preferred physicians to play the primary role
in decision-making."); Lesley F. Degner & Jeffrey A. Sloan, Decision Making
During Serious Illness: What Role Do Patients Really Want to Play?, 45 J.
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 941, 941 (1992); Jack Ende et al., Measuring Pa-
tients' Desire for Autonomy: Decision-Making and Information-Seeking Prefer-
ences Among Medical Patients, 4 J. GEN. INRERNAL MED. 23, 26-27 (1989)
(finding that patients' desire to make autonomous decisions declined in rela-
tion to the severity of the illness); Robert F. Nease, Patient Desire for Infor-
mation and Decision Making in Health Care Decisions: The Autonomy Prefer-
ence Index and the Health Opinion Survey, 10 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 593,
596 (1995) (finding that many patients have little desire to be involved in
medical decisionmaking).
124. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing
plaintiffs allegation that but for ERISA fiduciary's wrongful silence, her hus-
band would have opted to personally cover the costs of a cardiologist visit).
125. See, e.g., id. at 625.
126. See id. at 629 ("Health care decisions involve matters of life and
death, and an ERISA fiduciary has a duty to speak out if it knows that silence
might be harmful.' (quoting Bixler v. Central Penn. Teamsters Health & Wel-
fare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993))); see also supra note 94 and ac-
companying text (discussing the common law of trusts).
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duty to disclose physician incentives, Supreme Court precedent
commands courts to respect ERISA's text when incorporating
the common law of trusts to supplement its express provi-
sions.127 Textual analysis is somewhat complicated by the fact
that ERISA has arguably two separate areas that govern dis-
closure, sections 101 to 111128 and section 404.129 None of these
sections specifically addresses whether plan fiduciaries must
inform MCO enrollees of physician incentive schemes. 130
The Supreme Court has observed that, when statutory
provisions are in arguable conflict, the more specific section
makes the more general section inapplicable. 3' Although courts
have interpreted section 404s general fiduciary duty of loyalty
to govern fiduciaries' communications with their beneficiaries, 2
this section does not specifically govern disclosure at all.'
Sections 101 to 111 do specifically address disclosure and enu-
merate several disclosure requirements. 4  However, these
sections also fail to address the disclosure of financial incen-
127. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining the importance
of textual interpretation).
128. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
129. Id. § 1104.
130. See id. § 1021.
131. See Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944)("However inclusive may be the general language of a statute, it 'will not be
held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same
enactment. ... Specific terms prevail over the general in the
same ... statute which otherwise might be controlling.') (quoting Ginsberg &
Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)). For an excellent discussion on the
use of maxims of statutory interpretation, see WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE & PHILIP
P. FRicKEY, CASEs AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 633-715 (2d ed. 1995).
132. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1074-75 (1995) (interpreting
the common law of trusts to require ERISA fiduciaries to speak truthfully to
plan beneficiaries); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that ERISA's fiduciary duty of loyalty requires MCO fiduciaries to
disclose physician incentive schemes to their enrollees); Bixler v. Central
Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that ERISA's fiduciary duty requires plan fiduciaries to convey
complete and accurate information in response to a beneficiary's request);
Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (ruling that
ERISA fiduciary's knowledge of beneficiary's circumstances required fiduciary
to disclose complete and accurate material information to plan beneficiary).
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994) (discussing general fiduciary responsibilities of
prudence and loyalty).
134. See id. §§ 1021-1031 (enumerating ERISA plan administrator's disclo-
sure obligations).
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tives.'35 In accordance with the "specific trumps the general"
canon, the specific disclosure requirements of sections 101 to
111 have been interpreted as an exhaustive list of disclosure
requirements that prevent courts from supplementing the
listed disclosure duties through expansive interpretations of
section 404.36 According to courts that have adopted this in-
terpretive strategy, by enacting sections 101 to 111, did all it
intended to do in the disclosure area. 37
Nevertheless, the "specific trumps the general" canon of
statutory interpretation is poorly suited to the inquiry of
whether ERISA requires MCOs and physicians to disclose
physician incentive arrangements to plan enrollees.' The Su-
preme Court has noted that "[t]o apply a canon properly one
must understand its rationale."'39 The "specific trumps the
general" canon is a "warning against applying a general provi-
sion when doing so would undermine limitations created by a
more specific provision'7' and thus frustrate congressional in-
tentions. This canon is merely a "rule of thumb,"" ' however,
and should not apply if there is evidence of contrary legislative
intent or policy.' 42 Given the fact that disclosure is the "core of
a fiduciary's responsibilit[ies]" under the common law of
trusts,'43 ERISA's incorporation of trust law indicates that
Congress did not intend ERISA's specifically enumerated dis-
closure obligations to be an exhaustive list.
3. Congressional Intention Requires Imposing an Affirmative
Duty to Disclose Physician Incentives on MCOs and
Physicians Under ERISA
Given the relatively recent appearance of HMOs as major
actors on the political stage, it is unlikely that Congress held
any specific intentions concerning their status and obligations
135. See id. §§ 1021-1031, 1104.
136. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1996);
Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
137. See, e.g., Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 754. According to the Weiss court,
"Had Congress seen fit to require the affirmative disclosure of physician com-
pensation arrangements, it could certainly have done so in ERISA §§ 101-
111." Id.
138. Cf Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1077 (1996).
139. Id.
140. Id.
14L See id.
142. Cf. Bintz, supra note 24, at 988.
143. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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when it enacted ERISA in 1974.'" It is also unlikely that Con-
gress considered the implications of capitated payment
schemes in relation to ERISA disclosure obligations. Clearly,
however, Congress intended to empower plan beneficiaries to
protect their interests under benefit plans by providing them
with information via express disclosure requirements and by
imposing fiduciary obligations on persons who exercise discre-
tion in the administration or management of ERISA plans.4
In addition, ERISA's fiduciary jurisprudence rests on the ac-
knowledgment that Congress intended courts to interpret
ERISA's provisions with respect to the common law of trusts as
a means of supplementing stated fiduciary obligations and pro-
tecting plan beneficiaries." Recognizing an affirmative duty to
disclose physician incentives furthers congressional intent in
at least two ways: (i) it empowers plan beneficiaries with ma-
terial information so that they can protect their own interests;
and (ii) it incorporates disclosure obligations found within the
common law of trusts.
4. ERISA's Purpose Supports Recognition of an Affirmative
Disclosure Duty
Reasonable legislators would not have intended to leave
plan beneficiaries in a worse situation than they would have
been in ERISA's absence. 47 However, interpreting ERISA's fi-
duciary obligations to exclude the disclosure of financial incentive
arrangements achieves exactly such a result. In the absence of
ERISA and its preemption provisions, persons would be entitled
to state protection from the dangers associated with the use of
financial incentives.14 Holding ERISA to exclude affirmative
144. Congress enacted the Health Maintenance Organization Act in 1973.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994). Despite Congress authorizing the establishment
of HMOs one year before enacting ERISA, HMOs did not become a dominant
force in the health market until the following decade. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
147. Under the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, courts as-
sume reasonable persons pursuing reasonable goals reasonably. See Philip
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321, 333 (1990) (discussing the purposive approach to statutory interpreta-
tion). Clearly, reasonable legislators would not intend to enact legislation de-
signed to make citizens worse off than they would have been in the absence of
such legislation.
148. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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disclosure obligations produces an anomalous result-a statute
premised on disclosure obligations potentially denies persons
material information to which they could otherwise be legally
entitled under state law.149 Given ERISA's recognition of dis-
closure as a means of enrollee empowerment, courts should
recognize that MCOs and physicians have a fiduciary duty un-
der ERISA to disclose information concerning physician -incen-
tive schemes.
5. Public Policy Supports Disclosure
Studies indicate that the majority of MCO enrollees are
not aware of the fact that their MCOs employ cost-containment
mechanisms to influence physician decisionmaling, mecha-
nisms that introduce potential conflicts of interest into their
relationships with their physicians.' In the absence of such
information, enrollees are deprived of important opportunities
to question their physicians' objectivity, to personally cover
treatments not covered by their health plans, and to use their
MCOs' grievance systems more aggressively. Instead, such en-
rollees accept physicians' recommendations solely on faith, ig-
norant of the possible conflicts of interest that may result in
improper medical decisions adverse to their long-term health.15'
Requiring MCOs and physicians to disclose physician incentive
information to MCO enrollees empowers enrollees with an in-
creased ability to protect their health interests from dangers
created by their MCOs. 52
The contextual dynamics of the patient-physician relation-
ship also support recognizing a duty for MCOs physicians to
disclose their compensation schemes to enrollees. Trust is the
linchpin of the patient-physician relationship.'53 This relation-
149. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
15L See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
152. According to one commentator:
With this knowledge, [an enrollee] might be more likely to take
charge of her health care destiny and aggressively use the existing
grievance procedures to get the desired treatment. The [MCO] would
view this outcome as undesirable, but the enrollee would arguably
view such an outcome as desirable: her knowledge about the compen-
sation structures used in her health plan empowered her to take a
more active role in decisions concerning her health care.
McGraw, supra note 9, at 1838-39.
153. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, supra note 53, at
331.
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ship is founded on the belief that "physicians are dedicated
first and foremost to serving the needs of their patients.""
Empirical studies indicate that the vast majority of persons
trust and follow their physicians' treatment recommenda-
tions.'55 Given the high degree of trust that persons place in
their physicians, it is unreasonable to expect that many per-
sons would independently question their physicians' objectivity
and investigate contractual incentives to reduce care. Conse-
quently, if neither physicians nor MCOs disclose physician in-
centive information to plan enrollees, many of them would pre-
sumably fail to educate themselves and gain access to material
information affecting their health interests. The informational
burden should not fall on enrollees, the parties least likely to
suspect any conflict of interest and those most vulnerable to
injury.
Opponents of an affirmative duty to disclose may argue
that such an imposition would harm patient and physician
dialogue by incorporating distrust and anxiety into this inti-
mate relationship. However, imposing disclosure obligations
on physicians may actually further the ideal of the patient and
physician relationship by fostering candid dialogue. Although
a recent survey indicates that many people would not trust
their physicians if they knew that they had financial incentives
to avoid certain treatments or testing procedures, 56 this study
does not speak to the effect that physician candor and subse-
quent dialogue would have on the patient and physician rela-
tionship. Physicians that address the topic in a forthright
manner would demonstrate their ability to speak truthfully to
patients and evidence their respect for their patients' auton-
omy and right to know material information. Under these cir-
cumstances, many patients would presumably be willing to
trust their physicians and enjoy an increased ability to protect
their health care interests.
154. Id. Since the time of Hippocrates, trust has been recognized as an
essential element of this intimate relationship. See Hippocratic Oath, re-
printed in JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE & MEDICINE 230 (1996). In
relevant part, the Hippocratic Oath states: "I will apply ... measures for the
benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from
harm and injustice.... Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the
benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice." Id.
155. See supra note 123.
156. See HMO Homepage (visited 2/17/1998) <http'/www.hmopage.org
/mechanics.html>.
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CONCLUSION
Patrick Shea's tragic story illustrates the materiality of in-
formation concerning physician compensation agreements with
MCOs. In order to protect and enforce their interests under an
ERISA health benefit plan, enrollees must be informed of the
existence and nature of financial incentives designed to affect
their physicians' decisionmaking. Requiring MCOs and physi-
cians to disclose such information furthers ERISA's primary
purpose of protecting plan beneficiaries through disclosure.
Furthermore, strong public policy arguments indicate that
MCOs and physicians should disclose the existence and nature
of physician incentives to MCO enrollees, thereby allowing
them to actively protect their interests in the era of managed
care.

